Edward Hopper, Chair Car (1965). © Estate of Edward Hopper.
Amina Aissaoui
The Dynamic Interplay Between Loneliness and Hostility
(Amina Aissaoui, Dikla Segel-Karpas, Oliver Huxhold, Liat Ayalon, and Marcus Mund)
Individuals feel lonely when they perceive a discrepancy between their desired and actual quantity and quality of social interaction. Most of the existing research on loneliness focuses on the connection between loneliness and internalising problems, such as depression, a more negative self-concept, internet addiction, and shyness. However, loneliness has also been associated with externalising problems, such as aggressive responding and hostile behaviour. Hostility is a broad psychological domain that encompasses various cognitive, emotional and behavioral aspects of a person’s negative orientation toward interpersonal transactions. Caccioppo’s evolutionary theory of loneliness suggests that loneliness triggers an emphasis on short-term self-preservation, including an increase in implicit vigilance for social threats and an increased concern for the individual’s own interests and welfare. This hypervigilance to cues of social exclusion is assumed to be related to an impaired regulation combined with distorted social cognition. These processes could negatively change the mental representations and expectations of others and promote hostile and defensive cognition, affect, and behaviour. From a theoretical perspective, it might be argued that higher-than-usual loneliness is prospectively associated with higher-than-usual hostility. In the present study, we extend prior research by (a) investigating reciprocal influences between loneliness and aspects of hostility in young adulthood and midlife and (b) considering within-person dynamics between loneliness and hostility. By implementing a Cross-lagged panel model in a sample of 18.359 German adults, we found a bidirectional association between loneliness and hostility-related characteristics. Furthermore, the results of the Random Intercept Cross-Lagged Panel Model and the Latent Curve Model with Structured Residuals showed that higher-than-usual loneliness was prospectively associated with higher-than-usual hostility and vice versa.
(Amina Aissaoui, Dikla Segel-Karpas, Oliver Huxhold, Liat Ayalon, and Marcus Mund)
Individuals feel lonely when they perceive a discrepancy between their desired and actual quantity and quality of social interaction. Most of the existing research on loneliness focuses on the connection between loneliness and internalising problems, such as depression, a more negative self-concept, internet addiction, and shyness. However, loneliness has also been associated with externalising problems, such as aggressive responding and hostile behaviour. Hostility is a broad psychological domain that encompasses various cognitive, emotional and behavioral aspects of a person’s negative orientation toward interpersonal transactions. Caccioppo’s evolutionary theory of loneliness suggests that loneliness triggers an emphasis on short-term self-preservation, including an increase in implicit vigilance for social threats and an increased concern for the individual’s own interests and welfare. This hypervigilance to cues of social exclusion is assumed to be related to an impaired regulation combined with distorted social cognition. These processes could negatively change the mental representations and expectations of others and promote hostile and defensive cognition, affect, and behaviour. From a theoretical perspective, it might be argued that higher-than-usual loneliness is prospectively associated with higher-than-usual hostility. In the present study, we extend prior research by (a) investigating reciprocal influences between loneliness and aspects of hostility in young adulthood and midlife and (b) considering within-person dynamics between loneliness and hostility. By implementing a Cross-lagged panel model in a sample of 18.359 German adults, we found a bidirectional association between loneliness and hostility-related characteristics. Furthermore, the results of the Random Intercept Cross-Lagged Panel Model and the Latent Curve Model with Structured Residuals showed that higher-than-usual loneliness was prospectively associated with higher-than-usual hostility and vice versa.
Bernice Brijan
Depression and Perceiving Loneliness: A Phenomenological Perspective
Studies have suggested that loneliness plays an important role psychopathological experience. In a general sense, Van den Berg states that: “Loneliness is the nucleus of psychiatry” (A different existence, p. 105). More specifically, prolonged loneliness has been associated with depression. However, the exact role of loneliness in psychopathological experience is unclear. One of the complicating factors is that the experience of loneliness is highly subjective; an individual can be alone without feeling lonely and can feel lonely even when with other people.
In this paper, the conceptualization of loneliness in the context of psychopathology will be approached from the perspective of phenomenology. A phenomenological approach is not concerned primarily with the contents of a thought process (what someone thinks), but with the ways in which thoughts denote changes in the structure of experience (how someone’s thoughts are colored by what is experienced). The background structure of experience is understood to concern an all-enveloping and pre-reflective sense of reality and of being rooted in a world. Changes in the experience of belonging to a shared world and having a sense of meaningful possibilities have been associated with certain types of psychopathological experience, such as depression.
It will be argued in the scope of this paper that experiences of loneliness are grounded in changes in the pre-reflective sense of reality and belonging. The central question the paper seeks to elaborate upon is whether loneliness can be thought of as a kind of perception (e.g., a perception of changes in existential feeling), or whether experiences of loneliness already involve thought (and if this is the case, how loneliness can be understood on a nonconceptual level: e.g., in terms of alienation or a loss of possibilities). In so doing, loneliness will be situated within the dynamic between experiences of suffering and existential questions.
Studies have suggested that loneliness plays an important role psychopathological experience. In a general sense, Van den Berg states that: “Loneliness is the nucleus of psychiatry” (A different existence, p. 105). More specifically, prolonged loneliness has been associated with depression. However, the exact role of loneliness in psychopathological experience is unclear. One of the complicating factors is that the experience of loneliness is highly subjective; an individual can be alone without feeling lonely and can feel lonely even when with other people.
In this paper, the conceptualization of loneliness in the context of psychopathology will be approached from the perspective of phenomenology. A phenomenological approach is not concerned primarily with the contents of a thought process (what someone thinks), but with the ways in which thoughts denote changes in the structure of experience (how someone’s thoughts are colored by what is experienced). The background structure of experience is understood to concern an all-enveloping and pre-reflective sense of reality and of being rooted in a world. Changes in the experience of belonging to a shared world and having a sense of meaningful possibilities have been associated with certain types of psychopathological experience, such as depression.
It will be argued in the scope of this paper that experiences of loneliness are grounded in changes in the pre-reflective sense of reality and belonging. The central question the paper seeks to elaborate upon is whether loneliness can be thought of as a kind of perception (e.g., a perception of changes in existential feeling), or whether experiences of loneliness already involve thought (and if this is the case, how loneliness can be understood on a nonconceptual level: e.g., in terms of alienation or a loss of possibilities). In so doing, loneliness will be situated within the dynamic between experiences of suffering and existential questions.
James Cartlidge
Loneliness as a Revelatory Mood: A Heideggerian Analysis
Heidegger developed a theory of ‘revelatory moods’: profound affective states where our experience is radically transformed and important existential insights, required for living more complete, meaningful and authentic lives, are conveyed to us. He only ever discussed anxiety and boredom in detail, but his account is ripe for development. Heidegger theorizes anxiety and boredom as moments where the significance of the world totally, temporarily, recedes from us. We become unable to make sense of anything and our experience of our world, usually structured in terms of significance, and relations of significance between things, is fundamentally altered. Through the temporary removal of significance, we become acutely aware of it, and of our free role in its creation and maintenance. Heidegger attempts to make sense of some of the most intense varieties of our emotional experiences, working out the deeper meaning behind them and their function in our existence.
I suggest that his theory of revelatory moods can be applied to loneliness. Are there not experiences of loneliness where people cease to make sense of the world in their usual way? Where they become so overwhelmed by their loneliness that the usual significance their world recedes from them? What would such an experience reveal to us about our being? I claim that deep loneliness is revelatory of freedom and significance, just as boredom and anxiety are. But deep loneliness is also revelatory of the fact that our freedom implicates and is constrained by others, and living an authentic, meaningful life necessarily involves a reckoning with the fact of our social being. This opens a political dimension to Heidegger’s early phenomenology that he famously wanted to avoid, but is nonetheless, necessarily and importantly, present in it.
Heidegger developed a theory of ‘revelatory moods’: profound affective states where our experience is radically transformed and important existential insights, required for living more complete, meaningful and authentic lives, are conveyed to us. He only ever discussed anxiety and boredom in detail, but his account is ripe for development. Heidegger theorizes anxiety and boredom as moments where the significance of the world totally, temporarily, recedes from us. We become unable to make sense of anything and our experience of our world, usually structured in terms of significance, and relations of significance between things, is fundamentally altered. Through the temporary removal of significance, we become acutely aware of it, and of our free role in its creation and maintenance. Heidegger attempts to make sense of some of the most intense varieties of our emotional experiences, working out the deeper meaning behind them and their function in our existence.
I suggest that his theory of revelatory moods can be applied to loneliness. Are there not experiences of loneliness where people cease to make sense of the world in their usual way? Where they become so overwhelmed by their loneliness that the usual significance their world recedes from them? What would such an experience reveal to us about our being? I claim that deep loneliness is revelatory of freedom and significance, just as boredom and anxiety are. But deep loneliness is also revelatory of the fact that our freedom implicates and is constrained by others, and living an authentic, meaningful life necessarily involves a reckoning with the fact of our social being. This opens a political dimension to Heidegger’s early phenomenology that he famously wanted to avoid, but is nonetheless, necessarily and importantly, present in it.
Andrée-Anne Cormier
Is Loneliness a Problem of Justice?
This paper explores the question of whether loneliness is a direct concern of justice. My goal is to show that although there is no individual right against being lonely, chronic loneliness is a fundamental problem of distributive justice. More specifically, I argue that the state has a basic obligation, non-reducible to other duties of justice, to adopt laws and policies aimed at empowering all citizens to overcome or avoid chronic loneliness. This obligation supports at least two specific rights: (1) the right to access treatment against chronic loneliness, and (2) the right to receive high quality relationships education, designed to develop basic social abilities and to promote cultures of social connection and acceptance of various models of intimacy and love. I defend this view against a range of objections, including those proposed by Elizabeth Anderson (1999) and Laura Valentini (2016). These objections target the claim that chronic loneliness is a fundamental concern of justice on the grounds that (1) loneliness can be the outcome of free choices, for which people should be held responsible; (2) some individuals experience loneliness for problematic or unjust reasons (e.g. as a result of a sense of entitlement to other people’s attention); (3) there are no political interventions that are at the same time morally permissible and effective in addressing loneliness. I argue that although these objections show that there is no individual right against loneliness as such, they do not invalidate the idea that there is a robust right to access treatment against chronic loneliness and to receive high quality relationships education, especially (but not only) during childhood and young adulthood.
This paper explores the question of whether loneliness is a direct concern of justice. My goal is to show that although there is no individual right against being lonely, chronic loneliness is a fundamental problem of distributive justice. More specifically, I argue that the state has a basic obligation, non-reducible to other duties of justice, to adopt laws and policies aimed at empowering all citizens to overcome or avoid chronic loneliness. This obligation supports at least two specific rights: (1) the right to access treatment against chronic loneliness, and (2) the right to receive high quality relationships education, designed to develop basic social abilities and to promote cultures of social connection and acceptance of various models of intimacy and love. I defend this view against a range of objections, including those proposed by Elizabeth Anderson (1999) and Laura Valentini (2016). These objections target the claim that chronic loneliness is a fundamental concern of justice on the grounds that (1) loneliness can be the outcome of free choices, for which people should be held responsible; (2) some individuals experience loneliness for problematic or unjust reasons (e.g. as a result of a sense of entitlement to other people’s attention); (3) there are no political interventions that are at the same time morally permissible and effective in addressing loneliness. I argue that although these objections show that there is no individual right against loneliness as such, they do not invalidate the idea that there is a robust right to access treatment against chronic loneliness and to receive high quality relationships education, especially (but not only) during childhood and young adulthood.
Julia Freitag
Differential loneliness trajectories of students during their first semester at university
Loneliness, the perception of social relationships as deficient with respect to communal aspects, is probably experienced by everyone under certain circumstances. In the present study, we examine changes in loneliness during the transition to university. The sample consists of 130 psychology freshmen who were repeatedly surveyed about their personality traits, loneliness, social needs and desires, general social contacts, circle of friends at university and social perceptions of other participants in a repeated round-robin design. We use Growth Mixture Models to identify latent trajectory classes of loneliness during the first academic semester and associate the resulting trajectory classes with relevant intra- and interpersonal variables. These variables include demographic variables, qualitative and quantitative social needs and their realization, relationship standards in friendships and their realization in close fellow students, the Big Five personality traits, shyness, and different social behaviour variables such as participation in social activities during the semester. Implications for loneliness research will be discussed.
Loneliness, the perception of social relationships as deficient with respect to communal aspects, is probably experienced by everyone under certain circumstances. In the present study, we examine changes in loneliness during the transition to university. The sample consists of 130 psychology freshmen who were repeatedly surveyed about their personality traits, loneliness, social needs and desires, general social contacts, circle of friends at university and social perceptions of other participants in a repeated round-robin design. We use Growth Mixture Models to identify latent trajectory classes of loneliness during the first academic semester and associate the resulting trajectory classes with relevant intra- and interpersonal variables. These variables include demographic variables, qualitative and quantitative social needs and their realization, relationship standards in friendships and their realization in close fellow students, the Big Five personality traits, shyness, and different social behaviour variables such as participation in social activities during the semester. Implications for loneliness research will be discussed.
Shaun Gallagher
Loneliness and the self-pattern
In Gallagher & Janz (2018) we explored the concept of solitude using concepts of self-pattern, affordance, and autonomy. Solitude is clearly not the same as loneliness, but in some cases solitude may result in loneliness, and, like solitude, loneliness takes many different forms. I propose that an analysis of loneliness, building on these same concepts, will help to clarify the phenomenon and provide insight into how different forms of loneliness relate to the intersubjective processes that contribute to a sense of self.
I’ll start by considering different forms of loneliness, broadly defined. There have been numerous attempts to classify different kinds of loneliness, but they often get confused with things that are clearly not loneliness, such as solitude or seclusion, which may or may not involve loneliness. I’ll define three different types of loneliness: clinical loneliness, culturally determined loneliness, and existential loneliness. My main concern will be to show how these three phenomena are different from each other, rather than how they are similar.
Specifically, I’ll show how each type of loneliness, insofar as it relates to affective and intersubjective processes, reflects a different self-pattern, modulates one’s field of affordances, and robs one of autonomy, understood relationally. I’ll argue that there are clear cures or therapies that can address both clinical and culturally determined loneliness, but that existential loneliness is more problematic in this regard depending on how one conceives it.
In Gallagher & Janz (2018) we explored the concept of solitude using concepts of self-pattern, affordance, and autonomy. Solitude is clearly not the same as loneliness, but in some cases solitude may result in loneliness, and, like solitude, loneliness takes many different forms. I propose that an analysis of loneliness, building on these same concepts, will help to clarify the phenomenon and provide insight into how different forms of loneliness relate to the intersubjective processes that contribute to a sense of self.
I’ll start by considering different forms of loneliness, broadly defined. There have been numerous attempts to classify different kinds of loneliness, but they often get confused with things that are clearly not loneliness, such as solitude or seclusion, which may or may not involve loneliness. I’ll define three different types of loneliness: clinical loneliness, culturally determined loneliness, and existential loneliness. My main concern will be to show how these three phenomena are different from each other, rather than how they are similar.
Specifically, I’ll show how each type of loneliness, insofar as it relates to affective and intersubjective processes, reflects a different self-pattern, modulates one’s field of affordances, and robs one of autonomy, understood relationally. I’ll argue that there are clear cures or therapies that can address both clinical and culturally determined loneliness, but that existential loneliness is more problematic in this regard depending on how one conceives it.
Richard Gipps
Love, Loneliness, and Secondary Sense
We often hear that loneliness stands to sociality as hunger does to food. And to be sure we do express loneliness with avowals such as “I feel so alone”, “There’s nobody to talk to”. We also know that company of a certain sort can ameliorate loneliness. Then again we know too that people with a robust sense of self-worth can spend much of their time alone without feeling lonesome - and that certain forms of sociality worsen rather than ameliorate the lonely state.
In this talk I suggest we rethink the loneliness/hunger analogy - and propose instead that loneliness is at heart a doubt that one is lovable and a fear that, whilst love surely exists in the world, one is signally exiled from its party. For the lonely, love now obtains ‘over there’, ‘between others’. Company distracts from the desolation, but is not itself the solution. That solution involves coming to trust that we are indeed lovable, at least if we relinquish such of our defences as make it hard for others to access us. Once the absence of loving company is known for a mere contingency, loneliness can be avoided.
But why then do the lonely say “I feel so alone”? The suggestion offered here is that, as also for “I feel so empty”, such utterances involve what Wittgenstein called a 'secondary sense’ of such terms as ‘alone’, ‘single’, ‘by myself’ etc. This is to say that, whilst the disposition to say such things is constitutive of the lonely state, and whilst we understand such utterances by resonating with them, they don’t provide the state’s literal content. Instead “I’m so alone” is the natural cry of a heart in imagined exile from love, a heart which has lost faith in its own lovability.
We often hear that loneliness stands to sociality as hunger does to food. And to be sure we do express loneliness with avowals such as “I feel so alone”, “There’s nobody to talk to”. We also know that company of a certain sort can ameliorate loneliness. Then again we know too that people with a robust sense of self-worth can spend much of their time alone without feeling lonesome - and that certain forms of sociality worsen rather than ameliorate the lonely state.
In this talk I suggest we rethink the loneliness/hunger analogy - and propose instead that loneliness is at heart a doubt that one is lovable and a fear that, whilst love surely exists in the world, one is signally exiled from its party. For the lonely, love now obtains ‘over there’, ‘between others’. Company distracts from the desolation, but is not itself the solution. That solution involves coming to trust that we are indeed lovable, at least if we relinquish such of our defences as make it hard for others to access us. Once the absence of loving company is known for a mere contingency, loneliness can be avoided.
But why then do the lonely say “I feel so alone”? The suggestion offered here is that, as also for “I feel so empty”, such utterances involve what Wittgenstein called a 'secondary sense’ of such terms as ‘alone’, ‘single’, ‘by myself’ etc. This is to say that, whilst the disposition to say such things is constitutive of the lonely state, and whilst we understand such utterances by resonating with them, they don’t provide the state’s literal content. Instead “I’m so alone” is the natural cry of a heart in imagined exile from love, a heart which has lost faith in its own lovability.
Emily Hughes/Becky Millar
Organised Loneliness: the Experience of Not Belonging in Prison, Care Homes and Lockdown
In The Origins of Totalitarianism (1973) Hannah Arendt describes loneliness as the experience of “not belonging to the world at all, which is among the most radical and desperate experiences of man” (475). Arendt argues that loneliness involves experiences of both “uprootedness” and “superfluousness,” and that what makes loneliness so unbearable is the concurrent loss of one’s self and the loss of the world (477). In her analysis of the organised loneliness of totalitarianism, Arendt argues that this loss of self and world involves the constriction of two fundamental freedoms: the “capacity to begin” (Arendt’s idea of natality) and “a space of movement between men” (473). In this paper, we draw upon Arendt’s conception of loneliness as the experience of not belonging to the world at all and apply it to the Merleau-Pontian notion of the embodied subject’s being-toward-the-world in order to analyse cases of organised loneliness. Focusing on prison, care homes, and lockdown, we explore how these externally imposed conditions can impair the capacity of the embodied subject to be toward the world, and thereby lead to a radical loss of self and world.
In The Origins of Totalitarianism (1973) Hannah Arendt describes loneliness as the experience of “not belonging to the world at all, which is among the most radical and desperate experiences of man” (475). Arendt argues that loneliness involves experiences of both “uprootedness” and “superfluousness,” and that what makes loneliness so unbearable is the concurrent loss of one’s self and the loss of the world (477). In her analysis of the organised loneliness of totalitarianism, Arendt argues that this loss of self and world involves the constriction of two fundamental freedoms: the “capacity to begin” (Arendt’s idea of natality) and “a space of movement between men” (473). In this paper, we draw upon Arendt’s conception of loneliness as the experience of not belonging to the world at all and apply it to the Merleau-Pontian notion of the embodied subject’s being-toward-the-world in order to analyse cases of organised loneliness. Focusing on prison, care homes, and lockdown, we explore how these externally imposed conditions can impair the capacity of the embodied subject to be toward the world, and thereby lead to a radical loss of self and world.
Mark James
Do digital hugs work? Care-full design in a mixed reality.
Although there is much cultural and individual variation around the practice of hugging, it is near universally regarded as a symbol of intimacy and close human connection. For many, the value of hugging has come to the fore over the past 18 months under the conditions of enforced social distancing during COVID. Newspaper reports (Linton 2021), popular songs (Fred Again 2021), and even advertising campaigns (Zolando 2020), encourage us to hang in there, that the hugs we crave are coming. But what is it about a hug from the ones we love that so many of us long for in their absence? Respondents to questionnaires on hugging highlight the themes of expressing care and providing consolation as central (Linton 2021). Simultaneously, many contemporary philosophers (e.g. Kearney 2021, Fuchs 2014) are pessimistic about our digitally mediated social spaces enabling genuinely social interactions. For Kearney, this is because of our excarnation in such spaces - that our flesh does not survive the translation into digital space and it denies us the possibility of touch. In this work we wish to push back against this pessimism somewhat. Using the example of the hug, we highlight the fact that the care and consolation of an effective interaction (hugginess) arises from a skillful engagement between huggers, in which resources from multiple dimensions and reality conditions, over and above physical touch, come to bear. Central to our claim here is that the hugginess of a hug is emergent from the intersection of a manifold of influences within the interaction, only some of which are physical. By distilling what the other dimensions of a caring hug are, we suggest a low-tech solution to the problem the digital hug presents, i.e. that the possibilities for caring and consoling relations mediated through digital technologies have more to do with the design of the rituals and practices that surround our online interactions, than they do with improvements to the technologies themselves. Interestingly, developing this case points to the fact that our our digital spaces are more incarnated than some philosophers like to believe, and emphasizing these dimensions and reincarnating such spaces can make for more caring digitally mediated interactions.
Although there is much cultural and individual variation around the practice of hugging, it is near universally regarded as a symbol of intimacy and close human connection. For many, the value of hugging has come to the fore over the past 18 months under the conditions of enforced social distancing during COVID. Newspaper reports (Linton 2021), popular songs (Fred Again 2021), and even advertising campaigns (Zolando 2020), encourage us to hang in there, that the hugs we crave are coming. But what is it about a hug from the ones we love that so many of us long for in their absence? Respondents to questionnaires on hugging highlight the themes of expressing care and providing consolation as central (Linton 2021). Simultaneously, many contemporary philosophers (e.g. Kearney 2021, Fuchs 2014) are pessimistic about our digitally mediated social spaces enabling genuinely social interactions. For Kearney, this is because of our excarnation in such spaces - that our flesh does not survive the translation into digital space and it denies us the possibility of touch. In this work we wish to push back against this pessimism somewhat. Using the example of the hug, we highlight the fact that the care and consolation of an effective interaction (hugginess) arises from a skillful engagement between huggers, in which resources from multiple dimensions and reality conditions, over and above physical touch, come to bear. Central to our claim here is that the hugginess of a hug is emergent from the intersection of a manifold of influences within the interaction, only some of which are physical. By distilling what the other dimensions of a caring hug are, we suggest a low-tech solution to the problem the digital hug presents, i.e. that the possibilities for caring and consoling relations mediated through digital technologies have more to do with the design of the rituals and practices that surround our online interactions, than they do with improvements to the technologies themselves. Interestingly, developing this case points to the fact that our our digital spaces are more incarnated than some philosophers like to believe, and emphasizing these dimensions and reincarnating such spaces can make for more caring digitally mediated interactions.
Bruce Janz
Loneliness and its Others
Unlike solitude and being alone, where one could imagine these states as falling anywhere on a continuum between desired and undesired, loneliness does not seem to have an ambiguous nature. It is hard to imagine a non-pathological desired version of loneliness – it seems to only be a lack or an absence of something that should be there. But what is it an absence of? Friendship? Community? Love? Belonging? Meaning? Understanding on the part of others?
In this paper, I will frame loneliness through its other(s) as an affect (rather than only as an emotion), that is, a form of facing a world and in so doing assembling it. An affect is a form of care, both about the self and also about an assembled space in which the self has agency and meaning. Affect is bodily action – a “facing”, literally and figuratively, to the rest of the world. And, an affect is also a form of desire, specifically a desire for an assemblage in which the self plays a meaningful role.
Taking loneliness as an affect starts to make sense out of why it can’t be alleviated simply by putting a person into a social situation (the person was already in a social situation, but lonely within it). And, it starts to make some sense out of why animal companions, robot companions, and other non-humans might have an effect on one’s loneliness, in some cases.
Unlike solitude and being alone, where one could imagine these states as falling anywhere on a continuum between desired and undesired, loneliness does not seem to have an ambiguous nature. It is hard to imagine a non-pathological desired version of loneliness – it seems to only be a lack or an absence of something that should be there. But what is it an absence of? Friendship? Community? Love? Belonging? Meaning? Understanding on the part of others?
In this paper, I will frame loneliness through its other(s) as an affect (rather than only as an emotion), that is, a form of facing a world and in so doing assembling it. An affect is a form of care, both about the self and also about an assembled space in which the self has agency and meaning. Affect is bodily action – a “facing”, literally and figuratively, to the rest of the world. And, an affect is also a form of desire, specifically a desire for an assemblage in which the self plays a meaningful role.
Taking loneliness as an affect starts to make sense out of why it can’t be alleviated simply by putting a person into a social situation (the person was already in a social situation, but lonely within it). And, it starts to make some sense out of why animal companions, robot companions, and other non-humans might have an effect on one’s loneliness, in some cases.
Joel Krueger/Tom Roberts
Loneliness, Absence, and Psychopathology
In earlier work (Roberts & Krueger 2020), we have offered a philosophical analysis of loneliness as an ‘emotion of absence’: an affective state in which an agent becomes aware that something is missing and out of easy reach, either temporarily or permanently. In loneliness, what is absent is the suite of social goods that accrue from close personal relationships. On one hand, these include the everyday benefits of interpersonal contact, such as conversation, companionship, and advice. On the other hand, social relationships afford deeper personal goods, such as the chance to build a reflective and evaluative perspective on the world in dialogue with others; and to act in ways that allow a rich array of other-involving character traits to flourish. Loneliness is thus an experience of certain valuable opportunities appearing to be missing, and of an attenuation to one’s own powers as a social being.
In this talk, we begin by summarising this conceptual framework and highlighting its explanatory value for understanding loneliness, solitude, and isolation in temporary and chronic cases. Then, we apply this framework to psychiatric conditions. We argue that this account not only helps clarify the distinctive phenomenology of (non-pathological) loneliness, but that it can shed light on an underexplored aspect of psychopathology, too. Drawing upon reports from both depression and schizophrenia, we show that individuals suffering from mental disorders often experience a kind of “ontological loneliness”: an objective lack of access to important self-regulative resources found in other people and things which, in turn, shapes the subjective character of their isolation and disconnection. We consider the character of this ontological loneliness, why it’s been overlooked in much current literature, and why it matters for how we think about intervention and treatment.
In earlier work (Roberts & Krueger 2020), we have offered a philosophical analysis of loneliness as an ‘emotion of absence’: an affective state in which an agent becomes aware that something is missing and out of easy reach, either temporarily or permanently. In loneliness, what is absent is the suite of social goods that accrue from close personal relationships. On one hand, these include the everyday benefits of interpersonal contact, such as conversation, companionship, and advice. On the other hand, social relationships afford deeper personal goods, such as the chance to build a reflective and evaluative perspective on the world in dialogue with others; and to act in ways that allow a rich array of other-involving character traits to flourish. Loneliness is thus an experience of certain valuable opportunities appearing to be missing, and of an attenuation to one’s own powers as a social being.
In this talk, we begin by summarising this conceptual framework and highlighting its explanatory value for understanding loneliness, solitude, and isolation in temporary and chronic cases. Then, we apply this framework to psychiatric conditions. We argue that this account not only helps clarify the distinctive phenomenology of (non-pathological) loneliness, but that it can shed light on an underexplored aspect of psychopathology, too. Drawing upon reports from both depression and schizophrenia, we show that individuals suffering from mental disorders often experience a kind of “ontological loneliness”: an objective lack of access to important self-regulative resources found in other people and things which, in turn, shapes the subjective character of their isolation and disconnection. We consider the character of this ontological loneliness, why it’s been overlooked in much current literature, and why it matters for how we think about intervention and treatment.
Yael Lavi
“Can I be bound any longer?”
On the phenomenology of epistemological loneliness in David Hume's writing.
What bounds one to existence? An instinct? A habit? Some meanings? or maybe fear? Probably all of these. However, while trust breaks down, all of these become questionable, and so does the relational environment in which it evolved. It is an Epistemological crisis that could be described as an Epistemology of Loneliness.
“Everyone keeps at a distance, and dreads that storm, which beats upon me from every side [...] I have declared my disapprobation of their systems [...] When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, anger, calumny and detraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance.” [ Hume T. 1.4.7.3]
This picture of isolation, helplessness, and hopelessness, taken from the "A Treatise of Human Nature," Hume describes the destructive impact of philosophical doubt's penetration into everyday life. Hume's account of what can be diagnosed as major depressive disorder symptoms may give a glimpse of what it is like to be in a state of epistemological loneliness. When the broken Logos-Physic connection incites a deep sense of estrangement
Twenty years later, the question of boundedness appears again in Hume's short paper "Of Suicide," perhaps one of the most influential, and cited texts in the debate over voluntary death. Over the past 250 years, “Of suicide" has been philosophically analyzed, evaluated, and reconstructed. These discussions tended to focus upon the argument's logical validity within the framework of either moral or theological inquiry. Nonetheless, I will argue that Hume's essay raises another and more primary question regarding the relation between doubt, loneliness, and meaning, which may be formulated in Hume's words: "Can I be bound any longer?"
I will begin by addressing the relationship between loneliness and doubt in the Treatise. Then I will turn to “Of Suicide” to show that the Treatise's destructive doubt bears a constructive dimension of human freedom. Employing a structural analysis of the essay, I will show that Hume's arguments should not be taken as a moral claim, but on the contrary, as a claim to suspend the moral discussion to explore the structure of the human phenomenon of epistemological loneliness. I will offer an analysis according to which the skeptical move isolates the subject in both an active and passive manner. In this state of affair, the brute vulnerability of being, of human-being, is exposed throughout the painful, imperfect, and finite body as well as through imperfect and finite reasoning, which fails to explain and justify contingency and suffering. When the burden of senselessness and loneliness untie boundness, living is not obvious nor obligatory anymore.
© Yael Lavi 2021, School of Philosophy, Linguistics and Science Studies, Tel Aviv University . [yaellavi@mail.tau.ac.il].
On the phenomenology of epistemological loneliness in David Hume's writing.
What bounds one to existence? An instinct? A habit? Some meanings? or maybe fear? Probably all of these. However, while trust breaks down, all of these become questionable, and so does the relational environment in which it evolved. It is an Epistemological crisis that could be described as an Epistemology of Loneliness.
“Everyone keeps at a distance, and dreads that storm, which beats upon me from every side [...] I have declared my disapprobation of their systems [...] When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, anger, calumny and detraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance.” [ Hume T. 1.4.7.3]
This picture of isolation, helplessness, and hopelessness, taken from the "A Treatise of Human Nature," Hume describes the destructive impact of philosophical doubt's penetration into everyday life. Hume's account of what can be diagnosed as major depressive disorder symptoms may give a glimpse of what it is like to be in a state of epistemological loneliness. When the broken Logos-Physic connection incites a deep sense of estrangement
Twenty years later, the question of boundedness appears again in Hume's short paper "Of Suicide," perhaps one of the most influential, and cited texts in the debate over voluntary death. Over the past 250 years, “Of suicide" has been philosophically analyzed, evaluated, and reconstructed. These discussions tended to focus upon the argument's logical validity within the framework of either moral or theological inquiry. Nonetheless, I will argue that Hume's essay raises another and more primary question regarding the relation between doubt, loneliness, and meaning, which may be formulated in Hume's words: "Can I be bound any longer?"
I will begin by addressing the relationship between loneliness and doubt in the Treatise. Then I will turn to “Of Suicide” to show that the Treatise's destructive doubt bears a constructive dimension of human freedom. Employing a structural analysis of the essay, I will show that Hume's arguments should not be taken as a moral claim, but on the contrary, as a claim to suspend the moral discussion to explore the structure of the human phenomenon of epistemological loneliness. I will offer an analysis according to which the skeptical move isolates the subject in both an active and passive manner. In this state of affair, the brute vulnerability of being, of human-being, is exposed throughout the painful, imperfect, and finite body as well as through imperfect and finite reasoning, which fails to explain and justify contingency and suffering. When the burden of senselessness and loneliness untie boundness, living is not obvious nor obligatory anymore.
© Yael Lavi 2021, School of Philosophy, Linguistics and Science Studies, Tel Aviv University . [yaellavi@mail.tau.ac.il].
Zohar Lederman
Loneliness- From The Cloud, to The Bedside, to Public Health
Loneliness has been a major concern for philosophers, poets, and psychologists for centuries. In the past several decades, it has concerned clinicians and public health practitioners as well. The research on loneliness is so captivating and feels so urgent for several reasons. First, loneliness has been and still is extremely ubiquitous, potentially affecting people across multiple demographics and geographical areas. Second, it is philosophically intriguing, and its analysis delves into different branches of philosophy including phenomenology, existentialism, philosophy of mind etc. Third, empirical research has shown that loneliness is a significant health risk factor, equaling obesity and diabetes. Loneliness may thus be defined as a (negative) social determinant of health.
Having said that, Covid-19 has demonstrated how little we as members of humanity have been prepared for the pandemic of loneliness resulting from the global response to the virus. As people worldwide are literally dying from loneliness, we still do not know what makes one feel lonely while making another feel being in solitude, or how is it that one feels lonely in the heart of Boston.
My presentation will specifically explore the urgent and perplexing gap between what was written about the ethics of loneliness and loneliness from a public health perspective. Authors writing about the ethics of loneliness seem to focus mainly on one’s personal responsibility to face loneliness and convert it into productive solitude. Research into the social determinants of health, however, proves that structural, social and political factors are much more influential than one’s personal responsibility. Clear definitions and rigorous conceptual analysis, then, will beget just and effective public health policies.
I will thus join the other speakers in the panel in asking whether and what we as a society owe those who are lonely. Together with Andrée-Anne Cormier I will argue that individuals do have a positive and a negative right not to be lonely. Such right stems in turn from the right to health.
Loneliness has been a major concern for philosophers, poets, and psychologists for centuries. In the past several decades, it has concerned clinicians and public health practitioners as well. The research on loneliness is so captivating and feels so urgent for several reasons. First, loneliness has been and still is extremely ubiquitous, potentially affecting people across multiple demographics and geographical areas. Second, it is philosophically intriguing, and its analysis delves into different branches of philosophy including phenomenology, existentialism, philosophy of mind etc. Third, empirical research has shown that loneliness is a significant health risk factor, equaling obesity and diabetes. Loneliness may thus be defined as a (negative) social determinant of health.
Having said that, Covid-19 has demonstrated how little we as members of humanity have been prepared for the pandemic of loneliness resulting from the global response to the virus. As people worldwide are literally dying from loneliness, we still do not know what makes one feel lonely while making another feel being in solitude, or how is it that one feels lonely in the heart of Boston.
My presentation will specifically explore the urgent and perplexing gap between what was written about the ethics of loneliness and loneliness from a public health perspective. Authors writing about the ethics of loneliness seem to focus mainly on one’s personal responsibility to face loneliness and convert it into productive solitude. Research into the social determinants of health, however, proves that structural, social and political factors are much more influential than one’s personal responsibility. Clear definitions and rigorous conceptual analysis, then, will beget just and effective public health policies.
I will thus join the other speakers in the panel in asking whether and what we as a society owe those who are lonely. Together with Andrée-Anne Cormier I will argue that individuals do have a positive and a negative right not to be lonely. Such right stems in turn from the right to health.
Joanna Mchugh Power
Concepts of loneliness in health research: a theoretical synthesis approach
Loneliness is a focus in public health research currently, yet a clear consensus definition is not available. We wanted to address this issue using a theoretical synthesis approach, bringing together theories of loneliness from psychological, psychiatric, and public health literatures. Theoretical syntheses allow the researcher to integrate and compare across available descriptions of a concept, ultimately to develop an understanding of causes and consequences. Prior attempts to integrate theories of loneliness have frequently omitted biological accounts, or have been pursued without rigorous methodology. Using Pound and Campbell’s (2015) breakdown of the theoretical synthesis approach, we took three steps to synthesise theories of loneliness: a) preparation (extract and summarise existing theories); b) compare theories, and c) refine theories. A total of 38 relevant articles were identified and coded according to a template analysis approach. Our resulting model describes loneliness as constituting five intraindividual levels (biological, developmental, cognitive, personality, and existential), four interindividual and societal levels (intimates, networks, situational factors, and cultural factors). We discuss the potential utility of such a synthesised model, and opportunities for transdisciplinary research to go further in refining concepts of loneliness.
Loneliness is a focus in public health research currently, yet a clear consensus definition is not available. We wanted to address this issue using a theoretical synthesis approach, bringing together theories of loneliness from psychological, psychiatric, and public health literatures. Theoretical syntheses allow the researcher to integrate and compare across available descriptions of a concept, ultimately to develop an understanding of causes and consequences. Prior attempts to integrate theories of loneliness have frequently omitted biological accounts, or have been pursued without rigorous methodology. Using Pound and Campbell’s (2015) breakdown of the theoretical synthesis approach, we took three steps to synthesise theories of loneliness: a) preparation (extract and summarise existing theories); b) compare theories, and c) refine theories. A total of 38 relevant articles were identified and coded according to a template analysis approach. Our resulting model describes loneliness as constituting five intraindividual levels (biological, developmental, cognitive, personality, and existential), four interindividual and societal levels (intimates, networks, situational factors, and cultural factors). We discuss the potential utility of such a synthesised model, and opportunities for transdisciplinary research to go further in refining concepts of loneliness.
Valeria Motta
Absence of Other and Disruption of Self: A Phenomenological Study on The Meaning of Loneliness
The growing awareness that social relations play a fundamental role in psychological well-being has led mental health researchers to integrate work on loneliness and social support. This has influenced most of the characterizations that we have of loneliness nowadays. Thus, when characterizing loneliness, there is a tendency to focus on social distress and the absence of other people, which is just one aspect of the experience.
I describe a phenomenology of loneliness, based on a study that explores the nature of experiences of loneliness and solitude. One finding is that loneliness is not only about disconnection from others but also about disruption of self and self-knowledge. I will show (1) how attunement to a range of elements in the environment rather than only feeling connected to people are important factors to consider when it comes to understanding the experience of loneliness; (2) how the meaning of loneliness is constituted by an awareness of absence and that this instance of absence is only partly related to other people. In this sense, being rooted in a world that is coherent, and the capacity to appear to others and to oneself are connected. Another finding is that loneliness arises in discrepancy and incongruence. That is, another key characteristic of loneliness is that it is often experienced even when surrounded by others. The experience includes a sense of discrepancy, of disconnection and contrast. This common contextual, cultural understanding of 'loneliness' is reflected in literature (theoretical and experiential) which refers to a disconnection between what there is ‘outside’ and what the person feels ‘inside’ (as in the paradoxes summarised by Achterbergh et al, 2020, for example). In my study I found that participants also referred to other sorts of contrasting experiences, beyond the social-relational domain. I will show how a close look at the intentionality of the experience of loneliness may provide a more comprehensive account of this contrast. A third finding is that absence-in-presence distinguishes loneliness from other experiences that involve absence, such as social isolation. Loss and disconnection are experienced even when surrounded by others. This is one of the most striking characteristics of loneliness and what distinguishes loneliness from other experiences such as social isolation. One may say that it seems obvious that people do not need to connect with everyone around them, and another may counter that they do need to connect with someone. This paradox is familiar, but a sense of incongruence is an important aspect of someone's experience of loneliness. I will show how the experience of absence of self and the disconnection between poles of intentionality seem to converge here, to illuminate the experience of feeling lonely even when around others.
The growing awareness that social relations play a fundamental role in psychological well-being has led mental health researchers to integrate work on loneliness and social support. This has influenced most of the characterizations that we have of loneliness nowadays. Thus, when characterizing loneliness, there is a tendency to focus on social distress and the absence of other people, which is just one aspect of the experience.
I describe a phenomenology of loneliness, based on a study that explores the nature of experiences of loneliness and solitude. One finding is that loneliness is not only about disconnection from others but also about disruption of self and self-knowledge. I will show (1) how attunement to a range of elements in the environment rather than only feeling connected to people are important factors to consider when it comes to understanding the experience of loneliness; (2) how the meaning of loneliness is constituted by an awareness of absence and that this instance of absence is only partly related to other people. In this sense, being rooted in a world that is coherent, and the capacity to appear to others and to oneself are connected. Another finding is that loneliness arises in discrepancy and incongruence. That is, another key characteristic of loneliness is that it is often experienced even when surrounded by others. The experience includes a sense of discrepancy, of disconnection and contrast. This common contextual, cultural understanding of 'loneliness' is reflected in literature (theoretical and experiential) which refers to a disconnection between what there is ‘outside’ and what the person feels ‘inside’ (as in the paradoxes summarised by Achterbergh et al, 2020, for example). In my study I found that participants also referred to other sorts of contrasting experiences, beyond the social-relational domain. I will show how a close look at the intentionality of the experience of loneliness may provide a more comprehensive account of this contrast. A third finding is that absence-in-presence distinguishes loneliness from other experiences that involve absence, such as social isolation. Loss and disconnection are experienced even when surrounded by others. This is one of the most striking characteristics of loneliness and what distinguishes loneliness from other experiences such as social isolation. One may say that it seems obvious that people do not need to connect with everyone around them, and another may counter that they do need to connect with someone. This paradox is familiar, but a sense of incongruence is an important aspect of someone's experience of loneliness. I will show how the experience of absence of self and the disconnection between poles of intentionality seem to converge here, to illuminate the experience of feeling lonely even when around others.
Marcus Mund
What do we Measure When we Measure Loneliness? A Comparison of Measurement Instruments
Across its research history, several measures have been developed to assess loneliness. In some of those measures, loneliness is operationalized as a multi-dimensional construct (e.g., Rasch-Type Loneliness Scale, RTLS), whereas it is seen as unidimensional in others (e.g., UCLA Loneliness Scale, UCLA-LS). Furthermore, in many studies, loneliness has been measured via a single item‑a practice often criticized because of the unknown validity and reliability of single-item measures. In the present study, we examined the psychometric features of the RTLS, UCLA-LS, and three single-item measures. Specifically, we investigated (a) the convergent validity of the different measures and its facets, (b) the extent of self-informant agreement, and (c) similarities and differences in the nomological nets of the different instruments using correlates related to demography, personality, domain-specific satisfaction, and network characteristics. In two studies (Study 1: N = 697 self-ratings, N = 282 informant-ratings of 163 targets; Study 2: N = 1,216 individuals from 608 couples), we found high convergent validity in the self- (average rStudy 1 = .63, average rStudy 2 = .59) and informant-ratings (average rStudy1 = .66, average rStudy2 = .47) and high agreement between self and informants (rStudy1 = .51, rStudy2 = .39/.43). Moreover, the nomological nets were largely consistent across instruments (Study 1: .82 < ICCDE < .99; Study 2: .77 < ICCDE < .99) and across studies (.87 < ICCDE < .92). Despite this picture of overall convergence, there were several differences between measurement instruments that can be consequential for the operationalization of loneliness in specific research contexts. We discuss these aspects and derive general recommendations for measuring loneliness in adulthood.
Across its research history, several measures have been developed to assess loneliness. In some of those measures, loneliness is operationalized as a multi-dimensional construct (e.g., Rasch-Type Loneliness Scale, RTLS), whereas it is seen as unidimensional in others (e.g., UCLA Loneliness Scale, UCLA-LS). Furthermore, in many studies, loneliness has been measured via a single item‑a practice often criticized because of the unknown validity and reliability of single-item measures. In the present study, we examined the psychometric features of the RTLS, UCLA-LS, and three single-item measures. Specifically, we investigated (a) the convergent validity of the different measures and its facets, (b) the extent of self-informant agreement, and (c) similarities and differences in the nomological nets of the different instruments using correlates related to demography, personality, domain-specific satisfaction, and network characteristics. In two studies (Study 1: N = 697 self-ratings, N = 282 informant-ratings of 163 targets; Study 2: N = 1,216 individuals from 608 couples), we found high convergent validity in the self- (average rStudy 1 = .63, average rStudy 2 = .59) and informant-ratings (average rStudy1 = .66, average rStudy2 = .47) and high agreement between self and informants (rStudy1 = .51, rStudy2 = .39/.43). Moreover, the nomological nets were largely consistent across instruments (Study 1: .82 < ICCDE < .99; Study 2: .77 < ICCDE < .99) and across studies (.87 < ICCDE < .92). Despite this picture of overall convergence, there were several differences between measurement instruments that can be consequential for the operationalization of loneliness in specific research contexts. We discuss these aspects and derive general recommendations for measuring loneliness in adulthood.
Pritika Nehra
Loneliness and Intersubjectivity
Instead of a negative characterization of loneliness as a lack/absence/loss, I present loneliness as a response to intersubjectivity that underlines socio-political considerations of belonging. Solitude and loneliness emerge as affinities to the self through our encounter with an ‘other.’ These affinities are further linked with concerns of plurality (different others) and sameness. It would be a mistake to infer that since loneliness is a subjective experience, intersubjectivity or the connection with others is inessential to it. The experience of the other plays an important role in not just loneliness but all experiences of the ego. Through the lens of Hannah Arendt’s views, first I develop a phenomenology of various lonely states viz., isolation, solitude, loneliness, and superfluousness to demarcate them from each other. Then, I proceed to establish how each of them connect with intersubjectivity within a common, shared world and the consequences of experiencing these states of loneliness. The lonely person implies an enclosed wordless mind and raises questions about meaning and the dependency on other minds for a conception of an intersubjective and shared social reality. Human existence is structurally oriented toward others. Loneliness brings into question the dualism of the external world and the internal reality of human beings (subjectivity and the world) more sharply. It makes us think about our bodily embeddedness in the world. Loneliness is not merely a subjective response but more importantly, it is a response to the intersubjectivity of the world. What makes loneliness a dehumanizing experience is its impact on the capacities of thinking, speech, and action. Further, I connect Loneliness with concerns about equality and democracy: to consider how unjust socio-political structures are bound to create social pathologies.
Instead of a negative characterization of loneliness as a lack/absence/loss, I present loneliness as a response to intersubjectivity that underlines socio-political considerations of belonging. Solitude and loneliness emerge as affinities to the self through our encounter with an ‘other.’ These affinities are further linked with concerns of plurality (different others) and sameness. It would be a mistake to infer that since loneliness is a subjective experience, intersubjectivity or the connection with others is inessential to it. The experience of the other plays an important role in not just loneliness but all experiences of the ego. Through the lens of Hannah Arendt’s views, first I develop a phenomenology of various lonely states viz., isolation, solitude, loneliness, and superfluousness to demarcate them from each other. Then, I proceed to establish how each of them connect with intersubjectivity within a common, shared world and the consequences of experiencing these states of loneliness. The lonely person implies an enclosed wordless mind and raises questions about meaning and the dependency on other minds for a conception of an intersubjective and shared social reality. Human existence is structurally oriented toward others. Loneliness brings into question the dualism of the external world and the internal reality of human beings (subjectivity and the world) more sharply. It makes us think about our bodily embeddedness in the world. Loneliness is not merely a subjective response but more importantly, it is a response to the intersubjectivity of the world. What makes loneliness a dehumanizing experience is its impact on the capacities of thinking, speech, and action. Further, I connect Loneliness with concerns about equality and democracy: to consider how unjust socio-political structures are bound to create social pathologies.
Elena Popa
Loneliness as Cause
This paper aims to investigate how loneliness can be singled out as a cause for use in models relevant to areas such as public health, clinical, or social psychology, and more broadly within a biopsychosocial approach to health and illness. I will employ two models of causality previously applied to psychiatry, interventionism (Kendler & Campbell 2009) and causal mechanisms (Kendler et al. 2011). These are based on broader contemporary accounts to causation connected to scientific practice (Woodward 2005; Glennan 1996; Machamer et al. 2000). Interventionism has the advantage of singling out causal connections without addressing the mind-body problem: causality comes down to invariance under interventions on the cause and effect variables. In the context of research on loneliness, this model could provide a framework for testing various therapeutic approaches to see whether they affect mental and physical well-being by decreasing loneliness. Still, the difficulty of testing loneliness through an ‘ideal experiment’ in the interventionist sense is a limitation of this approach, or at least calls for further conceptualization in relation to this context. The mechanistic model can provide detailed accounts of how and why loneliness affects various mental and physical processes. Explanations referring to psychological mechanisms appear to be of this nature, where loneliness leads to an individual feeling under threat, acting defensively as a result, and bringing about the subsequent degradation of existing social connections.
This paper aims to investigate how loneliness can be singled out as a cause for use in models relevant to areas such as public health, clinical, or social psychology, and more broadly within a biopsychosocial approach to health and illness. I will employ two models of causality previously applied to psychiatry, interventionism (Kendler & Campbell 2009) and causal mechanisms (Kendler et al. 2011). These are based on broader contemporary accounts to causation connected to scientific practice (Woodward 2005; Glennan 1996; Machamer et al. 2000). Interventionism has the advantage of singling out causal connections without addressing the mind-body problem: causality comes down to invariance under interventions on the cause and effect variables. In the context of research on loneliness, this model could provide a framework for testing various therapeutic approaches to see whether they affect mental and physical well-being by decreasing loneliness. Still, the difficulty of testing loneliness through an ‘ideal experiment’ in the interventionist sense is a limitation of this approach, or at least calls for further conceptualization in relation to this context. The mechanistic model can provide detailed accounts of how and why loneliness affects various mental and physical processes. Explanations referring to psychological mechanisms appear to be of this nature, where loneliness leads to an individual feeling under threat, acting defensively as a result, and bringing about the subsequent degradation of existing social connections.
Susana Ramirez Vizcaya
Loneliness as a closure of the affordance space: the case of COVID-19 pandemic
Physical distancing measures taken to prevent the spread of the Coronavirus Disease 19 (COVID-19) are having a detrimental impact on well-being. Among them, loneliness is a critical public health concern given the wide range of mental and physical health problems associated with it, such as depression, substance use, cognitive decline, and suicide risk. In psychology, loneliness is distinguished from social isolation in that the first one does not depend on social network size. Unlike social isolation, loneliness can be experienced even if surrounded by others, or not be experienced at all even if one is alone. In this regard, loneliness has been characterized as the subjective feeling of social isolation. Although loneliness was prevalent before the current pandemic, this extraordinary situation might shed some further light on the phenomenon. I propose that the feeling of loneliness might result from a closure in one's affordance space, i.e., a closure in the whole range of possibilities for action and interaction that the world affords. I argue that during the current pandemic, this closure has at least three sources. First, a full lockdown that impedes physically reaching other people and places leads to a closure in the possibilities for joint action and resources for affective regulation. Second, the partial presence of others through the virtual world involves a reduction of the full set of perceptual and interactive possibilities that other people habitually afford. Third, physical distancing measures involve sudden changes in sociocultural practices that can strongly impact our interpersonal affordances if our habitual ways of interaction clash with the new COVID-19 etiquette rules. While, in the short term, the feeling of loneliness can function as a transient coping mechanism that motivates people to strengthen their social bonds, when the possibilities of reconnection are constantly blocked, there is a risk that loneliness becomes entrenched as an emotional habit.
Physical distancing measures taken to prevent the spread of the Coronavirus Disease 19 (COVID-19) are having a detrimental impact on well-being. Among them, loneliness is a critical public health concern given the wide range of mental and physical health problems associated with it, such as depression, substance use, cognitive decline, and suicide risk. In psychology, loneliness is distinguished from social isolation in that the first one does not depend on social network size. Unlike social isolation, loneliness can be experienced even if surrounded by others, or not be experienced at all even if one is alone. In this regard, loneliness has been characterized as the subjective feeling of social isolation. Although loneliness was prevalent before the current pandemic, this extraordinary situation might shed some further light on the phenomenon. I propose that the feeling of loneliness might result from a closure in one's affordance space, i.e., a closure in the whole range of possibilities for action and interaction that the world affords. I argue that during the current pandemic, this closure has at least three sources. First, a full lockdown that impedes physically reaching other people and places leads to a closure in the possibilities for joint action and resources for affective regulation. Second, the partial presence of others through the virtual world involves a reduction of the full set of perceptual and interactive possibilities that other people habitually afford. Third, physical distancing measures involve sudden changes in sociocultural practices that can strongly impact our interpersonal affordances if our habitual ways of interaction clash with the new COVID-19 etiquette rules. While, in the short term, the feeling of loneliness can function as a transient coping mechanism that motivates people to strengthen their social bonds, when the possibilities of reconnection are constantly blocked, there is a risk that loneliness becomes entrenched as an emotional habit.
Matthew Ratcliffe
What Is Lacking in Loneliness?
It seems plausible to suggest that loneliness involves experiencing the lack or absence of something. However, it is less clear what, exactly, is experienced as lacking. In this paper, I will take my lead from the phenomenologist and psychiatrist, J. H. van den Berg, who emphasizes a distinctive way of experiencing one’s surroundings. By drawing on some first-person accounts of loneliness during grief, I will identify the sense of being cut off or excluded from a certain kind of social participation as central to this. In its more extreme forms, this is described in terms of being in a different world from everyone else, looking on from elsewhere with no prospect of joining them. I will go on to analyze this in terms of how we experience possibilities: certain possibilities appear as there for them, but at the same time as inaccessible to me.
It seems plausible to suggest that loneliness involves experiencing the lack or absence of something. However, it is less clear what, exactly, is experienced as lacking. In this paper, I will take my lead from the phenomenologist and psychiatrist, J. H. van den Berg, who emphasizes a distinctive way of experiencing one’s surroundings. By drawing on some first-person accounts of loneliness during grief, I will identify the sense of being cut off or excluded from a certain kind of social participation as central to this. In its more extreme forms, this is described in terms of being in a different world from everyone else, looking on from elsewhere with no prospect of joining them. I will go on to analyze this in terms of how we experience possibilities: certain possibilities appear as there for them, but at the same time as inaccessible to me.
Louise Richardson
Loneliness and loss
Bereaved subjects sometimes report feeling lonely, or report experiences that can be interpreted as loneliness. What is the relationship between grief and loneliness, when the two occur together? I approach this question via the experiences of absence that both grief and loneliness, plausibly, involve. On the face of it, these experiences of absence are and must be different. Whereas grief following bereavement involves the experience of the absence of a particular person, if loneliness involves an experience of absence, it is one that is that is more general than that—an experience of the absence not of a particular person, but of social goods perhaps (Roberts and Krueger Forthcoming) or of personal interaction (Koch 1983). However, I propose that there is a kind of experience of absence in grief—the experience of the absence of a person as a condition on possibilities—that can also constitute loneliness or an aspect of it. Thus, sometimes, when a grieving subject has this kind of absence experience, they are thereby lonely, and since this absence experience is a constituent of grief, so is their loneliness. I suggest that this account can be extended to loneliness that occurs in the context of losses other than bereavement. However, since it is unlikely to apply to loneliness without loss, we have reason to doubt that a unified account of loneliness will be forthcoming.
Bereaved subjects sometimes report feeling lonely, or report experiences that can be interpreted as loneliness. What is the relationship between grief and loneliness, when the two occur together? I approach this question via the experiences of absence that both grief and loneliness, plausibly, involve. On the face of it, these experiences of absence are and must be different. Whereas grief following bereavement involves the experience of the absence of a particular person, if loneliness involves an experience of absence, it is one that is that is more general than that—an experience of the absence not of a particular person, but of social goods perhaps (Roberts and Krueger Forthcoming) or of personal interaction (Koch 1983). However, I propose that there is a kind of experience of absence in grief—the experience of the absence of a person as a condition on possibilities—that can also constitute loneliness or an aspect of it. Thus, sometimes, when a grieving subject has this kind of absence experience, they are thereby lonely, and since this absence experience is a constituent of grief, so is their loneliness. I suggest that this account can be extended to loneliness that occurs in the context of losses other than bereavement. However, since it is unlikely to apply to loneliness without loss, we have reason to doubt that a unified account of loneliness will be forthcoming.
Jamila Rodrigues
Missing bodies –loneliness and touch during pandemic times
The body has become a topic of interest for the social sciences increasingly, in our days especially. My interest in comprehending how different bodies' operate and express in different life situations they live, focusing on lack of social interaction, loss of touch and increased loneliness embodied experience. Pandemic forced us to constrain our bodies into private spaces and avoid "other bodies" through social distance. It also created a sense of being "apart from the flock", keeping our bodies safely out of reach but still wanting to remain 'in touch with others. Because communal sharing is an essential type of social relationship in which members implicitly assume that their bodies share a common substance that binds them together, which can be real, imagined, or implied (Fiske 2004), new technologies came to sustain our communal sharing. Nevertheless, the lack of touch and physical interaction has brought tremendous, imposed loneliness, which caused a disconnect between desired and actual levels of social interaction (Arbuckle 2018).
What is the impact of the loss of touch, and why touching may help people cope with loneliness in general and in pandemic times?
This talk will draw from Experiences of Social Distancing during the COVID-19 Pandemic project, and anonymous subjective reports of the effects of social distancing on people's experiences of self, others, and the world, their experiences of isolation and lockdown, how it affects interpersonal relationships and feeling of loneliness. COVID-19 is the catalyst for speeding up the embodiment and (dis)embodiment of bodily lived experience in these unusual times of the pandemic. Thus, touching and being touched may render people more willing to share resources and cope with loneliness in times of crisis.
The body has become a topic of interest for the social sciences increasingly, in our days especially. My interest in comprehending how different bodies' operate and express in different life situations they live, focusing on lack of social interaction, loss of touch and increased loneliness embodied experience. Pandemic forced us to constrain our bodies into private spaces and avoid "other bodies" through social distance. It also created a sense of being "apart from the flock", keeping our bodies safely out of reach but still wanting to remain 'in touch with others. Because communal sharing is an essential type of social relationship in which members implicitly assume that their bodies share a common substance that binds them together, which can be real, imagined, or implied (Fiske 2004), new technologies came to sustain our communal sharing. Nevertheless, the lack of touch and physical interaction has brought tremendous, imposed loneliness, which caused a disconnect between desired and actual levels of social interaction (Arbuckle 2018).
What is the impact of the loss of touch, and why touching may help people cope with loneliness in general and in pandemic times?
This talk will draw from Experiences of Social Distancing during the COVID-19 Pandemic project, and anonymous subjective reports of the effects of social distancing on people's experiences of self, others, and the world, their experiences of isolation and lockdown, how it affects interpersonal relationships and feeling of loneliness. COVID-19 is the catalyst for speeding up the embodiment and (dis)embodiment of bodily lived experience in these unusual times of the pandemic. Thus, touching and being touched may render people more willing to share resources and cope with loneliness in times of crisis.
Mauro Rossi
Three challenges to Roberts and Krueger’s account of loneliness
In this paper, I examine the recent account of loneliness put forward by Tom Roberts and Joel Krueger (2021). Roberts and Krueger focus on loneliness conceived of as an occurrent emotion. According to their account, loneliness involves two components: (1) a pro-attitude (e.g., a desire) towards certain social goods, and (2) an awareness that such goods “are missing and out of reach, either temporarily or permanently” (p. 2). In this paper, I raise three objections against their account. First, I argue that having a pair of pro-attitudes and cognitive states of the sort that Roberts and Krueger have in mind may be neither sufficient nor necessary for an individual to experience loneliness. Second, I argue that Roberts and Krueger’s account faces some difficulties when it comes to accounting for the unpleasant phenomenology of loneliness. Third, I argue that their account has trouble demarcating loneliness from other negative emotions, such as sadness, disappointment, and alienation, which one may experience within romantic, friendship, or social relationships. I conclude the paper by pointing to some directions for an alternative account of loneliness.
In this paper, I examine the recent account of loneliness put forward by Tom Roberts and Joel Krueger (2021). Roberts and Krueger focus on loneliness conceived of as an occurrent emotion. According to their account, loneliness involves two components: (1) a pro-attitude (e.g., a desire) towards certain social goods, and (2) an awareness that such goods “are missing and out of reach, either temporarily or permanently” (p. 2). In this paper, I raise three objections against their account. First, I argue that having a pair of pro-attitudes and cognitive states of the sort that Roberts and Krueger have in mind may be neither sufficient nor necessary for an individual to experience loneliness. Second, I argue that Roberts and Krueger’s account faces some difficulties when it comes to accounting for the unpleasant phenomenology of loneliness. Third, I argue that their account has trouble demarcating loneliness from other negative emotions, such as sadness, disappointment, and alienation, which one may experience within romantic, friendship, or social relationships. I conclude the paper by pointing to some directions for an alternative account of loneliness.
Alessandro Salice
Loneliness and the Sense of Us.
The talk aims at shedding light to the elusive phenomenon of loneliness by developing two exploratory claims.
The first claim is that the feeling of being lonely should be distinguished from the state of being alone. The first notion points to a self-conscious emotion, which has, as such, degrees of intensity and hedonic valence. The second notion refers to a property whose exemplification depends on the actual presence of others in the subject’s surrounding space. The two notions are typically correlated, but they need not be co-occurring. One can feel lonely even when one is not alone and one can be alone even when one is not feeling lonely. This raises the question as to what generates the feeling of being lonely. My second claim presents an answer to this question: this is the idea that loneliness (as an affective phenomenon) is a function of the sense of us or of togetherness. The claim is developed in two steps.
I begin by offering a description of the sense of us by drawing on recent literature about collective intentionality, where the sense of us has been identified as an important precondition of experiential sharing. For two individuals, a and b, to live through, say, an experience of joy together, a and b must understand themselves to be members of the same group, thereby eliciting a sense of us. I then suggest that one of the conditions that needs to be satisfied for a subject to feel lonely is a friction between two different experiences: the subject’s sense of us comes into tension with the subject’s awareness that, for some reasons (whether legitimate or not), it is not possible for this subject to share experiences with others. The hypothesis thus is that experiencing loneliness is experiencing this friction: living through one’s incapacity to share experiences with one’s group members.
The talk aims at shedding light to the elusive phenomenon of loneliness by developing two exploratory claims.
The first claim is that the feeling of being lonely should be distinguished from the state of being alone. The first notion points to a self-conscious emotion, which has, as such, degrees of intensity and hedonic valence. The second notion refers to a property whose exemplification depends on the actual presence of others in the subject’s surrounding space. The two notions are typically correlated, but they need not be co-occurring. One can feel lonely even when one is not alone and one can be alone even when one is not feeling lonely. This raises the question as to what generates the feeling of being lonely. My second claim presents an answer to this question: this is the idea that loneliness (as an affective phenomenon) is a function of the sense of us or of togetherness. The claim is developed in two steps.
I begin by offering a description of the sense of us by drawing on recent literature about collective intentionality, where the sense of us has been identified as an important precondition of experiential sharing. For two individuals, a and b, to live through, say, an experience of joy together, a and b must understand themselves to be members of the same group, thereby eliciting a sense of us. I then suggest that one of the conditions that needs to be satisfied for a subject to feel lonely is a friction between two different experiences: the subject’s sense of us comes into tension with the subject’s awareness that, for some reasons (whether legitimate or not), it is not possible for this subject to share experiences with others. The hypothesis thus is that experiencing loneliness is experiencing this friction: living through one’s incapacity to share experiences with one’s group members.
Ulla Schmid
The Loneliness of Being Oneself. Transcending one’s Boundaries in Alcohol Addiction
I suggest to understand loneliness as a breakdown in sociality, phenomenologically conceived as an ontological condition of human existence. In the first, conceptual part of my paper, I develop a notion of loneliness along the following lines:
1) Sociality becomes manifest in everyday life as the ‘transcendence of the other’. Others’ and one’s own practical and experiential standpoints in the world differ and are, at bottom, mutually inaccessible. In experiencing this difference of standpoints, the boundary between oneself and others is constituted as insurmountable, and the other is constituted as the inaccessible realm lying beyond. 2) Everyday reality is basically structured by social practices of engaging with the world. Participating in everyday reality means participating in a common standpoint transcending oneself, participating in the same reality is possible only as far as this standpoint carries. 3) Loneliness becomes phenomenally manifest as experiencing the mutual radical inaccessibility of one’s own and others’ standpoints. It appears whenever one’s own everyday reality radically differs from others. Loneliness essentially belongs to human existence, as one manifestation of ‘being-with’ others.
In the second, emprical part of my paper, I describe three ways in which the desire to overcome existential loneliness becomes thematic in alcohol addiction, drawing on 19 qualitative interviews with people having been treated for alcohol abusus/addiction.
1) Alcohol is the boundary-blurring drug par excellence. Specfically, alcohol consumption is often motivated by the desire to overcome the boundary between oneself and others, and thus to overcome one’s own (existential) loneliness.
2) Drinking alcohol is embedded in social practices of shared drinking, and this aspect of drinking also provides a means of overcoming loneliness and joining a shared way of negotiating the world.
3) However, pathological alcohol consumption is incompatible with participating in everyday reality and hence disables entering a common standpoint. Addiction to alcohol thus re-enacts the addict’s (self-) isolation rather than suspending it.
The futility of the attempt to overcome one’s own boundaries in alcohol addiction indicates the existential status of loneliness. It also indicates the impossibility of escaping from one’s own boundaries, on pain of reiterating them or destroying what is thereby bounded, eventually oneself.
I suggest to understand loneliness as a breakdown in sociality, phenomenologically conceived as an ontological condition of human existence. In the first, conceptual part of my paper, I develop a notion of loneliness along the following lines:
1) Sociality becomes manifest in everyday life as the ‘transcendence of the other’. Others’ and one’s own practical and experiential standpoints in the world differ and are, at bottom, mutually inaccessible. In experiencing this difference of standpoints, the boundary between oneself and others is constituted as insurmountable, and the other is constituted as the inaccessible realm lying beyond. 2) Everyday reality is basically structured by social practices of engaging with the world. Participating in everyday reality means participating in a common standpoint transcending oneself, participating in the same reality is possible only as far as this standpoint carries. 3) Loneliness becomes phenomenally manifest as experiencing the mutual radical inaccessibility of one’s own and others’ standpoints. It appears whenever one’s own everyday reality radically differs from others. Loneliness essentially belongs to human existence, as one manifestation of ‘being-with’ others.
In the second, emprical part of my paper, I describe three ways in which the desire to overcome existential loneliness becomes thematic in alcohol addiction, drawing on 19 qualitative interviews with people having been treated for alcohol abusus/addiction.
1) Alcohol is the boundary-blurring drug par excellence. Specfically, alcohol consumption is often motivated by the desire to overcome the boundary between oneself and others, and thus to overcome one’s own (existential) loneliness.
2) Drinking alcohol is embedded in social practices of shared drinking, and this aspect of drinking also provides a means of overcoming loneliness and joining a shared way of negotiating the world.
3) However, pathological alcohol consumption is incompatible with participating in everyday reality and hence disables entering a common standpoint. Addiction to alcohol thus re-enacts the addict’s (self-) isolation rather than suspending it.
The futility of the attempt to overcome one’s own boundaries in alcohol addiction indicates the existential status of loneliness. It also indicates the impossibility of escaping from one’s own boundaries, on pain of reiterating them or destroying what is thereby bounded, eventually oneself.
Philipp Schmidt
Structural loneliness in disorders of affective and social intentionality
In my talk, I examine and describe loneliness as a typical experiential aspect of the psychopathological condition of borderline personality disorder (BPD). I argue that loneliness in BPD is structural. My aim is to show that this is so because the affective disturbances characteristic of BPD imply a modification and disorder of social intentionality. More specifically, I suggest that there are structural aspects of emotional processes in BPD that translate into experiences of social detachment and feelings of loneliness. For instance, alexithymia, i.e., difficulties in identifying and labeling one’s own or others’ emotion, significantly undermines emotional sharing and thus connection with others. Describing relevant structural aspects of affective disturbances in BPD, the more general point I want to make is that loneliness, in BPD, is not only owed to recurring ruptures in social relationships and real loss of concrete others. It is also a structural condition in that the affective disturbances amount to a style in relating to others that makes it hard to enter, repair, and maintain attachment or experience connection. From this, I believe, we must conclude that loneliness, at least in some cases (BPD being one), can be considered pathological and structural. Accordingly, I propose, we need a complex account of loneliness, one which does justice to the variety of different forms of loneliness.
In my talk, I examine and describe loneliness as a typical experiential aspect of the psychopathological condition of borderline personality disorder (BPD). I argue that loneliness in BPD is structural. My aim is to show that this is so because the affective disturbances characteristic of BPD imply a modification and disorder of social intentionality. More specifically, I suggest that there are structural aspects of emotional processes in BPD that translate into experiences of social detachment and feelings of loneliness. For instance, alexithymia, i.e., difficulties in identifying and labeling one’s own or others’ emotion, significantly undermines emotional sharing and thus connection with others. Describing relevant structural aspects of affective disturbances in BPD, the more general point I want to make is that loneliness, in BPD, is not only owed to recurring ruptures in social relationships and real loss of concrete others. It is also a structural condition in that the affective disturbances amount to a style in relating to others that makes it hard to enter, repair, and maintain attachment or experience connection. From this, I believe, we must conclude that loneliness, at least in some cases (BPD being one), can be considered pathological and structural. Accordingly, I propose, we need a complex account of loneliness, one which does justice to the variety of different forms of loneliness.
Axel Seemann
Loneliness as a Three-Place Experiential Relation
I argue that the experience of loneliness is constituted by a misaligned, or absent, interpersonal relation between two or more persons and the sufferer’s attitude towards this relation. I begin by comparing the experience of loneliness with visual experience. Visual experience is transparent in the sense that it directly presents its object to the perceiver, rather than the perceiver’s relation to the object. The experience of loneliness is not promisingly modelled on visual experience. Its object is not simply other people or their absence. Loneliness is alleviated by the presence of those with whom one enjoys a reciprocal, interpersonal relationship. If that is right, the object of the experience of loneliness is not another person or their absence, but the interpersonal relation between oneself and the other person or persons. One way in which such a relation can be jeopardized is the absence of the other. Another way is a misalignment between its constituents. There are many possible reasons for such a misalignment, and it is not part of this talk to attempt to list them all.
Suppose I am right in thinking that the object of an experience of loneliness is not the other person but the relation between oneself and that person, and that it is in this sense not transparent. The experience could still be transparent in a different sense. It would be transparent in this different sense if the object of an experience of loneliness were the interpersonal relation between the sufferer and the other person. Then the sufferer would experience the interpersonal relation in the same way in which a perceiver experiences a visual object: her experience would present her with its object, not herself in relation to the object. I don’t think the experience of loneliness is transparent in this second sense either. The lonely person experiences herself as being lonely. She sees herself as a constituent of the misaligned, or absent, interpersonal relation. So the self features twice in the account: as a constituent of the interpersonal relation and the sufferer who ascribes that relation to herself. The resulting view of loneliness is a three-place account. It can explain two striking features of the experience of being lonely: it explains the intense self-awareness that is part of such experiences; and it explains why such experiences are not reliably correlated to the absence of others.
I argue that the experience of loneliness is constituted by a misaligned, or absent, interpersonal relation between two or more persons and the sufferer’s attitude towards this relation. I begin by comparing the experience of loneliness with visual experience. Visual experience is transparent in the sense that it directly presents its object to the perceiver, rather than the perceiver’s relation to the object. The experience of loneliness is not promisingly modelled on visual experience. Its object is not simply other people or their absence. Loneliness is alleviated by the presence of those with whom one enjoys a reciprocal, interpersonal relationship. If that is right, the object of the experience of loneliness is not another person or their absence, but the interpersonal relation between oneself and the other person or persons. One way in which such a relation can be jeopardized is the absence of the other. Another way is a misalignment between its constituents. There are many possible reasons for such a misalignment, and it is not part of this talk to attempt to list them all.
Suppose I am right in thinking that the object of an experience of loneliness is not the other person but the relation between oneself and that person, and that it is in this sense not transparent. The experience could still be transparent in a different sense. It would be transparent in this different sense if the object of an experience of loneliness were the interpersonal relation between the sufferer and the other person. Then the sufferer would experience the interpersonal relation in the same way in which a perceiver experiences a visual object: her experience would present her with its object, not herself in relation to the object. I don’t think the experience of loneliness is transparent in this second sense either. The lonely person experiences herself as being lonely. She sees herself as a constituent of the misaligned, or absent, interpersonal relation. So the self features twice in the account: as a constituent of the interpersonal relation and the sufferer who ascribes that relation to herself. The resulting view of loneliness is a three-place account. It can explain two striking features of the experience of being lonely: it explains the intense self-awareness that is part of such experiences; and it explains why such experiences are not reliably correlated to the absence of others.
Thomas Spiegel
Parasocial Relations and Loneliness – A Phenomenological Approach
In this talk I argue that modern forms of parasocial relations, rather than curb loneliness, merely conceal and exacerbate loneliness.
The process of social atomization is one of the most salient characteristics of life in the Western world. One of the most important driving factors of social atomization is the technologization and digitalization of both work and leisure.
The phenomenon of parasocial relationships (or parasocial interaction) has been first described by sociologists in the second half of the 20th century (Horton & Wohl 1956). Parasocial relationships feature at least one person featured in a (mass) medium like television and at least one other person consuming and interacting with this mediated presence. This relationship is necessarily lopsided and asymmetric: both sides of this relationship have limited and essentially different means of engagement, making a form of imagination one of the defining features of parasocial interactions (Valkenburg & Peter 2006). While parasocial relationships technically precede the advent of modern mass media (a believer’s relation to a deity is parasocial by design), they attain a new quality with the emergence of contemporary online social media, most notably through platforms like Instagram or Twitter and streaming providers like Twitch.
Loneliness is a secondary, yet fundamental existential condition of being human which consists in the absence of the second person. Trivially, loneliness is problematic in many different ways. Parasocial relations promise to curb loneliness through connecting people digitally in an effort to (re-)introduce the second person.
Drawing on the work of Martin Buber and Edith Stein, I demonstrate that parasocial relationships of the kind enabled by contemporary social media technologies do not qualify as relationships of the kind which would be able to dissipate loneliness. This is because parasocial relationships do not feature the second person at all, as shall be explained. The specific mode of interactive engagement, while pretending to traverse the ‘gulf’ between the first and the second person, serves to mask this fundamental disconnect – a disconnect which is not present in genuine I-Thou relationships. The talk closes by pointing towards the connection between loneliness and totalitarianism famously posited by Hannah Arendt to the effect that parasocial relationships, rather than combatting loneliness, might be conducive to the rise of totalitarianism.
In this talk I argue that modern forms of parasocial relations, rather than curb loneliness, merely conceal and exacerbate loneliness.
The process of social atomization is one of the most salient characteristics of life in the Western world. One of the most important driving factors of social atomization is the technologization and digitalization of both work and leisure.
The phenomenon of parasocial relationships (or parasocial interaction) has been first described by sociologists in the second half of the 20th century (Horton & Wohl 1956). Parasocial relationships feature at least one person featured in a (mass) medium like television and at least one other person consuming and interacting with this mediated presence. This relationship is necessarily lopsided and asymmetric: both sides of this relationship have limited and essentially different means of engagement, making a form of imagination one of the defining features of parasocial interactions (Valkenburg & Peter 2006). While parasocial relationships technically precede the advent of modern mass media (a believer’s relation to a deity is parasocial by design), they attain a new quality with the emergence of contemporary online social media, most notably through platforms like Instagram or Twitter and streaming providers like Twitch.
Loneliness is a secondary, yet fundamental existential condition of being human which consists in the absence of the second person. Trivially, loneliness is problematic in many different ways. Parasocial relations promise to curb loneliness through connecting people digitally in an effort to (re-)introduce the second person.
Drawing on the work of Martin Buber and Edith Stein, I demonstrate that parasocial relationships of the kind enabled by contemporary social media technologies do not qualify as relationships of the kind which would be able to dissipate loneliness. This is because parasocial relationships do not feature the second person at all, as shall be explained. The specific mode of interactive engagement, while pretending to traverse the ‘gulf’ between the first and the second person, serves to mask this fundamental disconnect – a disconnect which is not present in genuine I-Thou relationships. The talk closes by pointing towards the connection between loneliness and totalitarianism famously posited by Hannah Arendt to the effect that parasocial relationships, rather than combatting loneliness, might be conducive to the rise of totalitarianism.
Julian Stern
Being At One
We can see personhood as a philosophical and historical struggle between positive and negative forms of ‘being at one’, a struggle most succinctly described by Hölderlin, a central figure in Romanticism and German idealism through his close friendship and collaboration with Schelling and Hegel. For Hölderlin, ‘Being at one is god-like and good, but human, too human, the mania / Which insists there is only the One, one country, one truth and one way’. This paper is an exploration of a range of forms of aloneness, linked by the family resemblance of a number of such ‘solitude’ terms (loneliness, solitude, solitary, aloneness, lonesome, individual, atonement) to the idea of ‘oneness’.
‘Being at one’ was distinctively articulated in the Romantic period, in philosophy as well as in the arts. Based on this distinctiveness, albeit somewhat arbitrarily, this paper divides the development of ‘being at one’ between the pre-Romantic, Romantic, and post-Romantic eras. In the pre-Romantic era, positive forms of ‘being at one’ included various versions of enstasy and ecstasy, often articulated in religious traditions – notably Christian forms of atonement, or substitutionary atonement, and Hindu and Buddhist forms of enstatic ‘steadied wisdom’. Negative forms of being at one were mostly articulated as being one apart from the bigger one, for example through exile. Through this era, there was a growing movement towards individualism, especially within European traditions. In the Romantic period itself, positive forms of ‘being at one’ were often associated with being in or of ‘Nature’, and being an (individual) artist; negative forms were articulated in terms of being swallowed by the bigger ‘one’, and therefore losing individuality. In the post-Romantic period, positive forms of ‘being at one’ were often articulated through therapeutic and holistic traditions; negative forms could be described through being ‘one’s own worst enemy’, with individualism increasingly regretted.
We can see personhood as a philosophical and historical struggle between positive and negative forms of ‘being at one’, a struggle most succinctly described by Hölderlin, a central figure in Romanticism and German idealism through his close friendship and collaboration with Schelling and Hegel. For Hölderlin, ‘Being at one is god-like and good, but human, too human, the mania / Which insists there is only the One, one country, one truth and one way’. This paper is an exploration of a range of forms of aloneness, linked by the family resemblance of a number of such ‘solitude’ terms (loneliness, solitude, solitary, aloneness, lonesome, individual, atonement) to the idea of ‘oneness’.
‘Being at one’ was distinctively articulated in the Romantic period, in philosophy as well as in the arts. Based on this distinctiveness, albeit somewhat arbitrarily, this paper divides the development of ‘being at one’ between the pre-Romantic, Romantic, and post-Romantic eras. In the pre-Romantic era, positive forms of ‘being at one’ included various versions of enstasy and ecstasy, often articulated in religious traditions – notably Christian forms of atonement, or substitutionary atonement, and Hindu and Buddhist forms of enstatic ‘steadied wisdom’. Negative forms of being at one were mostly articulated as being one apart from the bigger one, for example through exile. Through this era, there was a growing movement towards individualism, especially within European traditions. In the Romantic period itself, positive forms of ‘being at one’ were often associated with being in or of ‘Nature’, and being an (individual) artist; negative forms were articulated in terms of being swallowed by the bigger ‘one’, and therefore losing individuality. In the post-Romantic period, positive forms of ‘being at one’ were often articulated through therapeutic and holistic traditions; negative forms could be described through being ‘one’s own worst enemy’, with individualism increasingly regretted.
Tom Stoneham
The Normative Structure of Loneliness
I assume loneliness is an emotional state. We can ask two distinct normative questions about an emotion-type: (1) what its appropriate objects are, and (2) when, if ever, is it appropriate to respond to those objects with that emotion. While philosophers have to some extent considered the first question with respect to loneliness, the second has not been addressed. This paper addresses both questions and considers the implications the answers have for our reaction to feelings of loneliness, both in ourselves and others:
1. The appropriate object of loneliness is a loss of, or a losing out on, the non-transactional
attention of others to oneself.
2. Comparing examples where, respectively, loneliness is and is not an appropriate emotion to be
feeling in the face of a loss of in-person social interaction will draw attention to the difference
between instances where (i) the lonely person is excluded from access to social goods and so
we can ascribe the occurrence of the situation – and thus their loneliness – to a malfunctioning
of society, and (ii) where both the problem, and therefore its solution, lie within the lonely
person.
3. Loneliness is not an appropriate response to the mere absence of social goods, such as having
no company for an evening/weekend/holiday.
4. By extension, the appropriate (adult) response to a mere absence of social goods requires one
to be comfortable in one’s own company: a skill that needs to be taught as much as the social
skills required for being comfortable in the company of others.
5. Furthermore, it seems that there could be a good and (mentally) healthy life which involves
the rejection of the emotion of loneliness, in the way the Buddhist rejects anger as always
inappropriate.
I assume loneliness is an emotional state. We can ask two distinct normative questions about an emotion-type: (1) what its appropriate objects are, and (2) when, if ever, is it appropriate to respond to those objects with that emotion. While philosophers have to some extent considered the first question with respect to loneliness, the second has not been addressed. This paper addresses both questions and considers the implications the answers have for our reaction to feelings of loneliness, both in ourselves and others:
1. The appropriate object of loneliness is a loss of, or a losing out on, the non-transactional
attention of others to oneself.
2. Comparing examples where, respectively, loneliness is and is not an appropriate emotion to be
feeling in the face of a loss of in-person social interaction will draw attention to the difference
between instances where (i) the lonely person is excluded from access to social goods and so
we can ascribe the occurrence of the situation – and thus their loneliness – to a malfunctioning
of society, and (ii) where both the problem, and therefore its solution, lie within the lonely
person.
3. Loneliness is not an appropriate response to the mere absence of social goods, such as having
no company for an evening/weekend/holiday.
4. By extension, the appropriate (adult) response to a mere absence of social goods requires one
to be comfortable in one’s own company: a skill that needs to be taught as much as the social
skills required for being comfortable in the company of others.
5. Furthermore, it seems that there could be a good and (mentally) healthy life which involves
the rejection of the emotion of loneliness, in the way the Buddhist rejects anger as always
inappropriate.
Ruth Tietjen/Rick Anthony Furtak
Loneliness, Love, and the Limits of Language
In this paper, we illuminate the affective phenomenon of loneliness by exploring how it relates to human existence, love (especially friendship), and communication. In our analysis, we repeatedly turn to poetic expressions of loneliness and reflect on the question of what it means to philosophize about loneliness, love, and the limits of language together rather than alone.
First, we introduce two border cases of loneliness: unfelt loneliness in which one’s individuality is denied and one therefore cannot feel lonely; and existential loneliness in which the possibility of intimacy and existential communication are denied and one therefore cannot but feel lonely. We argue that in denying individuality, unfelt loneliness makes real communication impossible; its most adequate expression is the murmur of a crowd. Existential loneliness, by contrast, is characterized by a loss of the belief in the very possibility of communication; in its most extreme form, it is a loneliness that cannot be said.
However, since both individuality and sociality are constitutive conditions of human existence, neither strictly speaking can be denied. In this regard, both “chronic unloneliness” and chronic loneliness are idealized states. In reality, even people on one or the other end of the scale of loneliness have had relationships that – at least in some regard – might qualify as friendship or (another form of) love. This points us to loneliness that occurs within intimate – even the most intimate – friendships themselves. Reflecting on (the ideal of) love as a totalizing movement that strives to understand and recognize the other in their totality, we argue that these forms of loneliness reflect either a partial failure of communication or the limits of communication. These limits in turn point back to the nature of human existence and love itself.
In this paper, we illuminate the affective phenomenon of loneliness by exploring how it relates to human existence, love (especially friendship), and communication. In our analysis, we repeatedly turn to poetic expressions of loneliness and reflect on the question of what it means to philosophize about loneliness, love, and the limits of language together rather than alone.
First, we introduce two border cases of loneliness: unfelt loneliness in which one’s individuality is denied and one therefore cannot feel lonely; and existential loneliness in which the possibility of intimacy and existential communication are denied and one therefore cannot but feel lonely. We argue that in denying individuality, unfelt loneliness makes real communication impossible; its most adequate expression is the murmur of a crowd. Existential loneliness, by contrast, is characterized by a loss of the belief in the very possibility of communication; in its most extreme form, it is a loneliness that cannot be said.
However, since both individuality and sociality are constitutive conditions of human existence, neither strictly speaking can be denied. In this regard, both “chronic unloneliness” and chronic loneliness are idealized states. In reality, even people on one or the other end of the scale of loneliness have had relationships that – at least in some regard – might qualify as friendship or (another form of) love. This points us to loneliness that occurs within intimate – even the most intimate – friendships themselves. Reflecting on (the ideal of) love as a totalizing movement that strives to understand and recognize the other in their totality, we argue that these forms of loneliness reflect either a partial failure of communication or the limits of communication. These limits in turn point back to the nature of human existence and love itself.
Sanna Tirkkonen
Is Loneliness a Feeling?
Loneliness is often described as an experience that is difficult to define. It is not a unitary phenomenon but an experience that takes different forms: it may be chronic or transient, occur in the presence of others or without others, and it may be accompanied by loss, grief, or abandonment. Recently historians of emotion have shown that loneliness emerged as a concept and became understood as a negative feeling only in the 19th century (Alberti 2019, Vincent 2020). This suggests that the concept is taken too much for granted in its everyday use.
Historicizing loneliness does not, however, detract from the fact that today a vast number of people self-identify as lonely and experience disconnection from others. In my talk I first argue that a study that bridges the gap between critical-historical analysis of concepts and a phenomenological investigation of experiences is needed. I defend a relationalist (interaffective) standpoint that defines loneliness as a way of relating to oneself through others. The common denominator between the different forms of loneliness could be characterized asthe experience of lacking a meaningful connection in a way that involves suffering. Second, I explore the relationship between loneliness and emotions in general. Descriptions of loneliness illustrate that the phenomenon cannot be dissociated from a whole range of feelings, emotions, and bodily sensations: sadness, disappointment, anxiety, emptiness, and hopelessness that may overlap or vary from one situation and interaction to another. Could loneliness itself be understood as a feeling, and if, in which sense?
Loneliness is often described as an experience that is difficult to define. It is not a unitary phenomenon but an experience that takes different forms: it may be chronic or transient, occur in the presence of others or without others, and it may be accompanied by loss, grief, or abandonment. Recently historians of emotion have shown that loneliness emerged as a concept and became understood as a negative feeling only in the 19th century (Alberti 2019, Vincent 2020). This suggests that the concept is taken too much for granted in its everyday use.
Historicizing loneliness does not, however, detract from the fact that today a vast number of people self-identify as lonely and experience disconnection from others. In my talk I first argue that a study that bridges the gap between critical-historical analysis of concepts and a phenomenological investigation of experiences is needed. I defend a relationalist (interaffective) standpoint that defines loneliness as a way of relating to oneself through others. The common denominator between the different forms of loneliness could be characterized asthe experience of lacking a meaningful connection in a way that involves suffering. Second, I explore the relationship between loneliness and emotions in general. Descriptions of loneliness illustrate that the phenomenon cannot be dissociated from a whole range of feelings, emotions, and bodily sensations: sadness, disappointment, anxiety, emptiness, and hopelessness that may overlap or vary from one situation and interaction to another. Could loneliness itself be understood as a feeling, and if, in which sense?